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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Plaintiff Randy L. T ice from the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant Centre Area Transportation Authority of State 
College (CATA) in Tice's action for damages under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 
S 12101 et seq. Tice advances thr ee claims: (1) that CATA 
discriminated against him on the basis of disability by 
discharging him, on a pretextual basis, in October 1996; (2) 
that CATA discriminated against him by r equiring an 
improper medical examination as a condition of his return 
to work in June 1996; and (3) that CATA failed to safeguard 
his medical records properly. This appeal requires us to 
interpret for the first time the ADA's pr ovisions regarding 
permissible and impermissible medical examinations and 
inquiries, located at 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d). 
 
Firstly, in deciding Tice's claim of discriminatory 
discharge, we must determine whether T ice was "disabled" 
within the meaning of the Act. This requir es us to decide 
whether a plaintiff can establish that he is"regarded as" 
disabled by his employer solely by virtue of the employer's 
request for a medical examination. Secondly, in the 
disposition of Tice's alternative claim that he was subject to 
an improper medical examination, we must consider the 
scope of the limitations placed by the ADA on employer- 
mandated medical examinations and inquiries. Thir dly, 
Tice's last claim requires us to consider whether a violation 
of the ADA's provisions regarding the confidentiality of 
medical records constitutes a per se compensable injury. 
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We ultimately conclude that an employer's r equest for a 
medical examination, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
establish that the employer "regarded" the employee as 
disabled, and thus cannot itself form the basis for 
establishing membership in the protected class under the 
ADA. As a result, Tice's claim of discriminatory discharge 
fails. We interpret the ADA to per mit medical examinations 
and inquiries upon a showing by the employer of job- 
relatedness and business necessity, and, because CATA 
has made such a showing in this case (which T ice has 
failed to rebut), we conclude that his claim of 
discrimination by way of an improper medical examination 
must also fail. Finally, we join several of our sister circuits 
in holding that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the ADA's 
recordkeeping and examination requir ements must 
demonstrate the existence of some actual damage in order 
to maintain his or her suit. Because Tice has not 
demonstrated that he suffered any injury as a result of 
CATA's recordkeeping violations, he cannot prevail on this 
claim. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
I. Facts 
 
Randy Tice has a long and checkered employment history 
with CATA. Therefore, because determinations under the 
ADA are quite fact-specific, we must r ecount much of the 
minutiae of Tice's odyssey through CA TA's medical leave 
procedures. 
 
Tice began his employment with CAT A as a bus driver in 
1988. During the relevant periods of Tice's employment, 
CATA's collective bargaining agr eement (CBA) with the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees Local 1203-B (the Union) allowed employees 
with serious injuries or illnesses to take up to two 
consecutive years of unpaid leave (while continuing to 
accrue seniority) for any single medical condition. If the 
employee did not return to work after two years, the 
employee would be deemed to have "voluntarily r esigned" 
under the terms of the CBA. However, if an employee were 
to return to work before the expiration of the two years and 
then leave again for the same illness or injury, the return 
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would only interrupt the two-year time clock if that 
employee worked for a minimum of six weeks befor e going 
back on leave. CATA's policy was to r equire that after 
taking such leave, the employee only be permitted to return 
after submitting a "Return to Work Certificate" from a 
treating physician, affirming that the employee was 
physically fit to resume his or her duties. 
 
In October 1993, Tice was injured at a McDonald's 
restaurant when a utility room door opened suddenly and 
struck him in the back. He continued to work until 
February 1994, when he informed CAT A that back 
problems resulting from the injury r equired him to take 
medical leave. Tice remained on leave thr oughout 1994 and 
all of 1995, except for a few brief periods when he 
attempted to return to his job but quickly discovered that 
his back injuries would not allow him to continue. His last 
such attempt took place for several weeks fr om September 
to October 1994, after which time he submitted to CA TA a 
note from Dr. Wayne Stokes stating that Tice was "to be off 
work until further notice and evaluation by sur geon." 
Subsequently, Tice submitted periodic updates on his 
condition to CATA, including a letter fr om a surgeon, Dr. 
Keith Kuhlengel, recommending that Tice r eceive back 
surgery. In the exchange of correspondence, CATA 
reminded Tice that if he desired to return to work, he 
would need to submit a doctor's note certifying that he 
could perform his duties without risk. 
 
In April 1996, Tice informed CAT A that in July he would 
be undergoing the back surgery r ecommended by Dr. 
Kuhlengel; however, in early June, Tice advised CATA that 
he had canceled his surgery and submitted a Return to 
Work Certificate, signed by Dr. Kuhlengel, stating that Tice 
could return to work if given an "air ride seat with lumbar 
support, power steering, lumbar work belt, 8 hr/day." The 
certification did not comment on the safety of T ice's return, 
either to himself or to his passengers. 
 
CATA requested further information from Dr. Kuhlengel 
before allowing Tice to retur n and, after an initial exchange 
of letters, CATA informed Tice that he would be required to 
submit to an Independent Medical Examination (IME) 
before he could be reinstated. No CA TA employee before (or 
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since) had ever been required to submit to an IME after 
taking medical leave, and CATA had not war ned Tice of 
such a possibility in its earlier correspondence. 
 
Tice filed a number of grievances with the Union 
regarding the delay in reinstatement. At this time, Tice also 
complained that CATA's method of r ecordkeeping 
improperly commingled confidential medical information 
with nonconfidential personnel information, in violation of 
the ADA's recordkeeping requir ements. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(d)(4)(C). In the course of union grievance 
procedures, CATA admitted that it had inadvertently failed 
to comply with the ADA's recordkeeping r equirements, but 
promised to modify its policies. After these violations were 
remedied, the Union withdrew this grievance. 
 
Tice submitted to the IME in August 1996, and was 
diagnosed with "lumbar spondylolysis with degenerate disc 
disease." The examining physician stated that with exercise 
and medication, Tice would nonetheless be able to work, 
and he returned to his job on August 21, 1996. He then 
settled his grievance with CATA regar ding the IME. The 
seniority he had accrued while on leave entitled him to bid 
on driving routes with newer buses that wer e equipped with 
the seating and steering accommodations he r equired. 
 
Tice worked for CATA for a month (fr om August 1996 to 
September 1996). However, on September 24, 1996, Tice 
was injured in an automobile accident unr elated to his 
employment with CATA, and submitted to CA TA a note 
from Dr. Stokes stating that he would not be able to 
continue to work because he had "sustained a shoulder 
contusion and bursitis and reexacerbation of his back 
pain." 
 
In October 1996, Tice's two-year period of leave was close 
to expiring because his brief return did not meet the six- 
week minimum required under the CBA. CA TA informed 
Tice that he would be deemed to have voluntarily resigned 
if he did not return by October 24, 1996. In response, on 
October 24, Tice submitted a note from one Dr. Worobec 
stating that due to a rotator cuff injury incurred in the 
automobile accident -- ostensibly a new injury, unrelated 
to the back injury that had originally kept him out of work 
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-- Tice would need to refrain fr om working for another two 
weeks. A few days later, CATA infor med him that it now 
considered him to have resigned. 
 
Both during his medical leave from CAT A, and after his 
termination in October 1996, Tice worked part-time 
cleaning and restocking for Allegheny Airlines, a job which 
he held until May 1997. Upon further training, he began 
work as an airline mechanic, continuing until February 
1998, when he injured his knee falling fr om the cockpit of 
a plane, requiring that his duties be lessened. Tice 
eventually left this employment because of an inconvenient 
commute. Subsequent to his employment with CA TA, Tice 
also ran a ticket-sales operation out of his home. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
After his termination from CAT A, Tice filed a grievance 
with the Union. The case was arbitrated in April 1997. The 
grievance and arbitration dealt only with Tice's allegations 
that his termination violated the CBA; no char ges of ADA 
violations were raised or considered. T ice claimed that his 
absence from work after September 1996 was due to "new" 
injuries unrelated to his initial back injury, thus entitling 
him to another two years of leave. In the alter native, Tice 
argued that CATA's request for an IME in June 1996 -- 
which resulted in a two-month delay in his r eturn to work 
-- was improper, and that, had CA TA not engaged in this 
impermissible action, he would have retur ned to his job in 
June, thus allowing him to meet the six-week minimum 
time period to stop the two-year time clock. On July 17, 
1997, the arbitrator denied Tice's grievance,finding that 
the IME had been proper under the CBA, and that Tice's 
absence from September 1996 to October 1996 was due to 
the original back injury. 
 
In October 1998, Tice filed suit against CA TA in the 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
alleging that CATA had violated the ADA by: (1) 
discriminating against him on the basis of disability by 
deliberately "misclassifying" his automobile accident 
injuries as "new" to justify Tice's discharge in October 
1996; (2) discriminating against him by requiring an 
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improper medical examination as a condition of his return 
to work in June 1996; and (3) failing to safeguar d his 
medical records properly.1  On May 17, 2000, the District 
Court granted CATA's motion for summary judgment, 
holding that Tice was not disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA, that CATA's request for an IME had not been 
improper under the ADA, and that Tice could not maintain 
his action regarding the recor dkeeping because he had 
failed to demonstrate any injury as a result of the 
violations. This appeal followed. The District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. W e set forth the 
familiar summary judgment standard in the mar gin.2 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. Improper Discharge Under the ADA  
 
The ADA forbids employers from "discriminat[ing] against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
disability of such individual in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(a). Tice's first claim is that CATA discriminated 
against him on the basis of disability by using his injuries 
incurred in the September 1996 automobile accident as a 
pretext for his discharge. To state a claim for employment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Tice also advanced claims against the Union and additional claims 
against CATA, alleging, inter alia, that the Union and CATA violated the 
Americans with Disabilities Act in the terms of the CBA itself, and that 
the Union breached its duty of fair repr esentation. These claims were not 
presented on appeal and thus are not befor e us. 
 
2. Summary judgment is proper if ther e is no genuine issue of material 
fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See F.R.C.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986). At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
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discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that he or she is a "qualified individual with a disability" 
within the meaning of the Act, and that he or she has 
suffered an adverse employment decision as a result of the 
discrimination. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 
F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
A "qualified individual with a disability" is "an individual 
with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires." 
42 U.S.C. S 12111(8). A "disability" is defined as: 
 
       (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
       limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
       individual; 
 
       (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
 
       (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12102(2). Although the statute does not define 
the term "major life activities," the EEOC has issued 
regulations explaining that major life activities are 
"functions such as caring for oneself, per forming manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, br eathing, 
learning, and working." 29 C.F.R.S 1630.2(i).3 
 
Tice argues that he is disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA because: (1) his back injury constitutes an impairment 
that "substantially limits" the "major life activity" of 
working; (2) he has a "record" of having such an 
impairment; and (3) CATA regar ded him as having such an 
impairment. We address these ar guments in turn. 
 
1. Tice's Back Injury 
 
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), 
the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase"substantially 
limits" as it is used in the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Although the Supreme Court has declined to rule on the degree to 
which courts must defer to these regulations, see notes 4 and 8, infra, 
the Court has interpreted and applied these r egulations in its own 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 
(1999). 
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A plaintiff attempting to establish disability on the basis of 
"substantial limitation" in the major life activity of 
"working" must, at minimum, allege that he or she is 
"unable to work in a broad class of jobs." Id. at 491. The 
Court explained that "[t]o be substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working, then, one must be pr ecluded 
from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a 
particular job choice." Id. at 492; see also Deane v. Pocono 
Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 n.7 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 
Tice has not alleged any limitation in the "major life 
activity" of working caused by his back injuries beyond his 
inability to drive a bus. In fact, he could not do so: Both 
before and after his termination fr om CATA, Tice found 
employment with an airline, and began operating a ticket 
sales business out of his home.4 He has not offered any 
evidence to suggest that his back injuries have caused him 
any difficulties beyond their interfer ence with his bus 
driving. Instead, he argues only that if he could not perform 
his bus driving duties without accommodation, "a jury 
could reasonably conclude that he was significantly 
restricted in the ability to perfor m either a class of jobs or 
a broad range of jobs." In other wor ds, even Tice himself 
cannot identify any limitations caused by his injuries 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Tice argues that the District Court, in determining that he was not 
disabled, improperly relied in part on his ability to find work as an 
airline mechanic because, at the time CAT A's discriminatory acts were 
alleged to have taken place, Tice did not have the requisite skills for 
such work. It is true that under our precedent, the determination as to 
whether a plaintiff is "substantially limited" in the activity of 
"working" 
is to be made with reference to the plaintiff 's particular skills and 
training. See Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stor es, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 784 
(3d Cir. 1998). However, we need not determine whether our holding in 
Mondzelewski -- which relied, in part, on deferring to EEOC regulations 
-- survives Sutton, see 527 U.S. at 479-80 (holding that the EEOC has 
not been granted authority to implement the definitional portions of the 
ADA, but refusing to rule on the degree of deference owed to such 
regulations), or even whether Mondzelewski  would control in a situation 
such as the one before us, where a plaintiff receives further training 
after the allegedly discriminatory acts have occurr ed. This is because 
even if we disregard the mechanic position, Tice was able to find at least 
two other jobs, and has failed to allege a limitation on any activity 
other 
than bus driving. 
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besides the limitation on bus driving, and would have the 
jury speculate as to whether there might possibly be jobs 
out there that he cannot perform. One would expect that, 
at minimum, if an individual is "substantially limited" in a 
"major life activity," he or she would be conscious of that 
limitation. Thus, Tice has not created a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether he suffers from a"disability" within the 
meaning of the ADA.5 
 
2. Record of Disability 
 
In the alternative, Tice submits that he has a "record of 
disability" based on his back injuries. This contention fails 
for the same reason that we hold Tice is not currently 
disabled. A plaintiff attempting to pr ove the existence of a 
"record" of disability still must demonstrate that the 
recorded impairment is a "disability" within the meaning of 
the ADA. Tice has only presented evidence that his 
impairment limited his ability to drive a bus-- once again, 
because an impairment that limits only bus driving is not 
a "disability," Tice has not demonstrated the existence of a 
record of disability. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Tice also comes close to contending that his diagnosis alone -- 
"lumbar spondylolysis with degenerate disc disease" -- is sufficient to 
establish disability within the meaning of the Act. However, it is well- 
established that a particular diagnosis, no matter how severe (or severe- 
sounding to the layperson), standing alone, is not sufficient to establish 
"disability." Rather, the inquiry as to disability is to be made on a 
case- 
by-case basis. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 
(1999) (holding that although some impairments might invariably be 
severe enough to substantially limit major life activities, the 
determination as to the existence of a disability is to be made via 
assessment of the impact on the particular individual); Olson v. General 
Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 953 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
plaintiff with an undisputed history of serious mental illness was not 
"substantially limited" in a major life activity). This scheme stands in 
contrast to the current system of awarding Social Security Disability 
Insurance benefits, which are granted, in part, upon the demonstration 
of the existence of one of the specific impair ments listed in the 
regulations. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804 
(1999) (comparing the two systems). 
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3. "Regarded as" Disabled Due to Required Medical 
Examination 
 
Tice further contends that, whether or not he is actually 
disabled, CATA regarded  him as disabled, and thus he can 
seek the ADA's protection through the"regarded as" 
definition of "disability." As proof of such regard, Tice 
points only to the fact that he was requir ed to take an IME 
when no other employee was forced to do so, even though 
CATA had the opportunity to consult dir ectly with his 
doctor. We will address the question whether CATA's IME 
comported with ADA requirements in Part III.B, infra; in 
this section, we deal with the distinct (though r elated) issue 
of whether the request for an IME demonstrates that CATA 
"regarded" Tice as disabled. 
 
For an individual to be "disabled" under the"regarded as" 
portion of the ADA's definition of disability, the individual 
must demonstrate either that: (1) despite having no 
impairment at all, the employer erroneously believes that 
the plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities; or (2) the plaintiff has a nonlimiting 
impairment that the employer mistakenly believes limits 
major life activities. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 489 (1999). In either case, the definition of 
"substantially limits" remains the same as it does in other 
parts of the statute -- i.e., if the individual is attempting to 
establish that the employer believed the individual to be 
limited in the life activity of "working," then "working" must 
encompass a broad class of jobs. See id.  at 489-93; see also 
Wright v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 204 F.3d 727, 731-33 
(7th Cir. 2000); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 
F.3d 635, 647 (2d Cir. 1998).6 
 
The ADA also has specific provisions, which we have 
rescribed in the margin, regar ding the propriety of 
employer-mandated medical examinations.7 These 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The EEOC regulations also allow for an individual to establish that he 
or she is "regarded as" disabled if he or she "[h]as a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a 
result 
of the attitudes of others toward such impair ment." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(l)(2). Tice does not claim to be disabled under this definition. 
7. The relevant portions of the statute pr ovide: 
 
       (d) Medical examinations and inquiries 
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provisions, which are not a model of legislative clarity, see 
Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1996), may 
leave an odd "gap" in setting out the scope of permissible 
examinations and inquiries. The Act expressly allows 
examinations or inquiries as to whether an employee has a 
disability or as to the severity of a disability, if such 
examinations/inquiries are job-related and consistent with 
business necessity. See 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4)(A). The Act 
also explicitly permits "inquiries" (but not examinations) as 
to an employee's ability to "perfor m job-related functions." 
42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4)(B). However, the Act is unclear as to 
whether examinations (rather than inquiries) are 
permissible if intended to evaluate the employee's ability to 
perform job-related functions, even if such examinations 
are not intended to discover whether an employee is 
"disabled" within the meaning of the Act, as permitted in 
S 12112(d)(4)(A). 
 
The EEOC regulations clarify the statute by explaining 
that "[a] covered entity may requir e a medical examination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (1) In general 
 
       The prohibition against discrimination as r eferred to in 
subsection 
       (a) of this section shall include medical examinations and 
inquiries. 
 
       . . . 
 
       (4) Examination and inquiry 
 
       (A) Prohibited examinations and inquiries 
 
       A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall 
       not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee 
       is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity 
of 
       the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be 
       job-related and consistent with business necessity. 
 
       (B) Acceptable examinations and inquiries 
 
       A covered entity may conduct voluntary medical examinations, 
       including voluntary medical histories, which ar e part of an 
       employee health program available to employees at that work site. 
       A covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an 
       employee to perform job-related functions. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12112(d). 
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(and/or inquiry) of an employee that is job-r elated and 
consistent with business necessity." 29 C.F .R. S 1630.14(c).8 
Under these standards, a request for an IME that complies 
with the statutory restrictions will never , in the absence of 
other evidence, be sufficient to demonstrate that an 
employer "regarded" the employee as substantially limited 
in a major life activity, simply because an examination that 
is "job-related" and "consistent with business necessity" 
must, at minimum, be limited to an evaluation of the 
employee's condition only to the extent necessary under the 
circumstances to establish the employee's fitness for the 
work at issue. Cf. Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 
F.3d 804, 811-12 (6th Cir. 1999). A r equest for such an 
appropriately-tailored examination only establishes that the 
employer harbors doubts (not certainties) with respect to an 
employee's ability to perform a particular job. Doubts alone 
do not demonstrate that the employee was held in any 
particular regard, see Colwell, 158 F.3d at 647, and, as we 
have explained, inability to perform a particular job is not 
a disability within the meaning of the Act, see Sullivan, 197 
F.3d at 811. Accord Wright , 204 F.3d at 732-33 (request for 
an examination does not establish that an employer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although in Sutton, the Supreme Court reserved the question whether 
the EEOC had been granted congressional authority to issue 
implementing regulations under 42 U.S.C. SS 12111-12117, and thus 
whether the regulations are owed defer ence under Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), we 
ourselves have held that EEOC implementing r egulations are owed 
"substantial deference" under Chevron. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 
F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). As we explained in note 4, 
supra, the Supreme Court expressly held in Sutton that the EEOC had 
not been given authority to issue implementing r egulations for Chevron 
purposes with regard to SS 12101-12102 of the ADA, while 
simultaneously allowing for the possibility that the EEOC was given 
such authority with regard to SS12111-12117. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 
478-79. Therefore, although we do not decide whether our holding in 
Pocono with respect to deference owed to regulations issued under 
SS12101-12102 survives Sutton, we do believe that our holding with 
respect to deference for regulations implementing S 12112(d) remains 
intact. Thus, we defer to the EEOC's interpr etation of S 12112(d) to 
permit examinations and inquiries that, although perhaps not intended 
to discover whether an employee is "disabled" within the meaning of the 
ADA, are job-related and consistent with business necessity. 
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regarded an employee as disabled wher e all the evidence 
suggested that the employer merely had doubts about the 
employee's abilities solely with respect to the physical 
demands of a single job); Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. 
Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir . 1998) (request for a 
mental examination of an employee who had exhibited 
strange behaviors does not establish that the employer 
"regarded" the employee as disabled because "[e]mployers 
need to be able to use reasonable means to ascertain the 
cause of troubling behavior without exposing themselves to 
ADA claims"). 
 
Indeed, even an improper IME r equest, without more, 
might not be sufficient to demonstrate that an employee 
was "regarded as" disabled. This is because an inquiry into 
how an employee was "regarded" is necessarily quite fact- 
specific, and all of the surrounding cir cumstances may be 
relevant in reaching a conclusion. So, for instance, if the 
IME is improper only for the reasons T ice has alleged -- 
i.e., because the employer already had sufficient 
information from other sources to gauge the employee's 
fitness for work -- such facts, standing alone, would not 
necessarily be determinative of how the employee was 
"regarded." 
 
At all events, this is not to say that a request for an IME, 
proper or improper, may not, taken in conjunction with 
other evidence or circumstances surrounding the request, 
establish that the employer regarded the employee as 
disabled. The important point is that the request and 
surrounding circumstances must establish that the 
employee was "regarded as" disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-93. So, for example, 
if it turned out that the employer's examination was not 
limited to an assessment of those potential impair ments 
that had occasioned the examination in the first place, but 
instead became a "wide-ranging assessment of mental or 
physical debilitation," Sullivan, 197 F .3d at 812, such 
evidence might be highly probative as to the nature of the 
employer's perception. Further, a r equest for an 
examination, taken in conjunction with evidence suggesting 
that the employer had no reasonable basis for harboring 
doubts about the employee's ability to do his or her job in 
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the first place, might also be probative as to the nature of 
the employer's regard. Thus, for T ice to use CATA's request 
for an IME to establish that CATA "r egarded" him as 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, he 
must raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether CA TA's 
request evinced a belief that Tice was unable to work in a 
"broad class of jobs." 
 
Tice has not even attempted to make such a showing. On 
the contrary, he has explicitly argued in his briefing only 
that "CATA believed Tice's impair ment precluded him from 
working as a bus driver." Further, it is undisputed that 
CATA's inquiries of Tice's doctor , and the IME itself, all 
focused solely on the physical requirements of bus driving.9 
 
Therefore, even if CATA believed Tice to be unable to 
drive a bus, such a regard would still not establish that 
CATA regarded him as disabled. Because there has been no 
other evidence besides the request for an IME submitted to 
establish the nature of CATA's "r egard" for Tice, we hold 
that Tice has not put forth sufficient evidence to create an 
issue of fact as to his entitlement to ADA pr otection. Thus, 
Tice has failed to make out the first element of a prima 
facie case of ADA discrimination, i.e., that of"disability," 
and his claim that CATA deliberately misclassified his 
injuries in order to effect a discriminatory discharge fails. 
 
B. The Propriety of the Independent Medical 
Examination 
 
Tice's next ADA claim is that CAT A violated the 
provisions of 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4) by requesting a 
medical examination that was not consistent with business 
necessity. Tice alleges that this impr oper examination 
resulted in an injury to him, because the delay occasioned 
by the requirement prevented him fr om working for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. For instance, on July 10, 1996, CAT A wrote to Dr. Kuhlengel with a 
list of tasks that a bus driver must be able to per form (such as 
assisting 
wheelchair users, climbing in and out of the bus, and operating all hand 
and foot controls), and asked for Dr. Kuhlengel's opinion as to Tice's 
ability to perform these tasks. T ice does not argue, and there is no 
evidence to suggest, that CATA inquir ed about any physical limitations 
beyond those demonstrably relevant to his job. 
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minimum six weeks necessary to interrupt the expiration of 
his two years of medical leave, eventually r esulting in his 
discharge. Therefore, Tice r equests monetary damages to 
remedy the alleged violation. 
 
We have held that Tice is not "disabled" within the 
meaning of the ADA, and it is not clear from the text of the 
ADA itself whether nondisabled individuals ar e permitted to 
sue for violations of S 12112(d). See, e.g., Watson v. City of 
Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (11th Cir . 1999) (declining 
to reach the question whether nondisabled individuals have 
a cause of action for violations of S 12112(d)); Armstrong v. 
Turner Indus., 141 F.3d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). As 
have many of our sister circuits, we leave for another day 
the question whether the ADA permits nondisabled 
individuals to sue, because it is clear that in this case, 
CATA's requirement of an IME was permissible under the 
statute. The evidence surrounding CAT A's request amply 
demonstrates that the examination was consistent with 
business necessity, and Tice has submitted virtually no 
evidence of his own in rebuttal. 
 
Throughout the course of his dealings with CA TA, Tice 
complained of severe pain and difficulty walking to the 
point of requiring "narcotic" medication. Moreover, he had 
apparently experienced "spasms" that interfered with his 
use of his legs such that CATA had r eceived complaints 
about reckless driving. There is no question that such a 
history raised legitimate safety concerns about Tice's ability 
to drive a bus. Tice does not even appear to dispute that 
CATA had cause to inquire about his medical condition. 
Rather, Tice submits that CAT A should have been content 
with being permitted to question Dr. Kuhlengel instead of 
forcing Tice to undergo a new medical examination. 
Therefore, we will review the infor mation CATA had at the 
time of its request for an IME. 
 
In July 1995, during Tice's medical leave, Dr . Kuhlengel 
wrote to CATA explaining that if T ice were to receive 
surgery, his chances of being able to r eturn to his job were 
"good to excellent," but that if he did not r eceive surgery, 
"his prognosis for return to full duties is limited." In April 
1996, Tice informed CATA that he would be undergoing 
surgery in July of that year, but in June he submitted the 
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note from Dr. Kuhlengel stating that he could perform his 
duties with special seating. Around this time, he also 
informed CATA that he had canceled the planned surgery. 
While Tice was on leave, CATA infor med him that to return, 
he would be required to submit doctor's certification that 
he could drive without risk. The certificate actually 
submitted did not mention risk or the safety of T ice or of 
his passengers, and, in fact, a supplement to the certificate 
was sent a few days later stating that Tice would be able to 
"man new lift equipped buses with associated duties as 
tolerated" (emphasis added). When CAT A requested that Dr. 
Kuhlengel provide more information about Tice's condition, 
Dr. Kuhlengel explained by letter that "I, as you are, am 
very concerned about passenger safety, and I'm relying on 
Mr. Tice's assessment of his capabilities, in that he feels he 
can perform the duties under safe conditions." 
 
Such evidence allows no serious dispute that CA TA was 
fully justified in its decision not to rely exclusively on Dr. 
Kuhlengel for an assessment of Tice's ability to perform his 
job. Dr. Kuhlengel had first recommended surgery, and 
provided no explanation as to his change of opinion. His 
diagnosis rested largely on Tice's own evaluation of his 
abilities, and his Return to Work Certificate essentially (and 
tautologically) stated no more than that T ice would be able 
to perform his duties as much as T ice could perform them. 
We believe that, under these facts, CA TA's unwillingness to 
rely on Dr. Kuhlengel's opinion was r easonable, and that its 
request for an IME was consistent with business necessity 
in order to ensure the safety of its passengers. See, e.g., 
Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 809 n.2 
(6th Cir. 1999) (once an employee's ability to perform his 
job has been placed in doubt, an employer may r equire a 
medical examination with a doctor of its choosing);  Yin v. 
California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[W]hen health 
problems have had a substantial and injurious impact on 
an employee's job performance, the employer can require 
the employee to undergo a physical examination designed 
to determine his or her ability to work. . . ."). 
 
Tice contends that CATA's request for an IME was not 
consistent with business necessity because CA TA had never 
before or since requested an IME. T ice particularly 
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emphasizes that on one occasion, an employee diagnosed 
with sleep apnea was permitted to retur n to work after four 
months' absence with only a doctor's certification as to his 
abilities. We find this evidence insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of fact as to the business necessity of CATA's 
request for an IME from Tice. 
 
The ADA's requirement that an IME be consistent with 
business necessity is an objective one. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. City 
of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that an employer's subjective belief in the 
"necessity" of a practice with discriminatory impact is not 
sufficient to escape Title VII liability). That is, even a "good 
faith" mandatory medical examination by an employer may 
nevertheless give rise to liability if the court determines 
that the examination was unwarranted. Cf. T aylor v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that there is no "reasonable mistake" defense to 
a claim of discrimination on the basis of disability where 
the "mistake" is premised on a generalized 
misunderstanding of the effects of the plaintiff 's disability). 
However, an employer's standard practice with regard to 
medical examinations is certainly relevant evidence of what 
is "necessary" (as suggested above, CA TA did not usually 
require them), and, just as we routinely hold that evidence 
of differential treatment among similarly situated employees 
is probative on the issue of discrimination in Title VII suits, 
see, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 
353-54 (3d Cir. 1999), an employer's dif ferential application 
of a medical examination requirement is r elevant evidence 
of what is "necessary" to the employer's business. 
 
Nonetheless, we do not believe that Tice has produced 
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to 
the necessity of the IME to which he was subject. If we are 
to compare the application of an IME requirement across 
employees, we must first establish that the employees are, 
in fact, similarly situated.10 But Tice has submitted no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. This is particularly important for ADA claims, because impairments 
may vary widely across employees, and an employer's animus toward, 
say, people with mental disabilities may not extend to people who use 
canes. Likewise, an employment practice that is per fectly permissible 
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details regarding this other (sleepy) employee; we do not 
know, for instance, the exact nature of that employee's 
illness, or whether the doctor who signed his Retur n to 
Work Certificate provided more details about the employee's 
condition than did Dr. Kuhlengel about T ice's impairment. 
Tice cannot survive summary judgment on such a minimal 
record. 
 
Moreover, any comparison between employees must be 
made with an eye to the ultimate inquiry, i.e., the necessity 
of the examination of the plaintiff. Although disparate 
treatment across employees may assist the factfinder in an 
otherwise uncertain case as to what the job "r eally" 
requires, it cannot suffice to cr eate an issue of fact as to 
"necessity" in a case such as this one, wher e the evidence 
is overwhelming that CATA had good r eason to be doubtful 
of Tice's abilities and to distrust the opinions of Dr. 
Kuhlengel. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the IME was job- 
related and fully consistent with business necessity, and 
will affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
to CATA on the issue of CATA's compliance with the 
medical examination provisions of 42 U.S.C.S 12112(d). 
 
C. Confidentiality of Medical Records  
 
Tice's final contention is that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment to CATA r egarding his claim 
for damages in light of CATA's admitted violation of those 
ADA provisions governing the confidentiality of medical 
records. See 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(3)(B) & (d)(4)(C) (requiring 
that medical records be kept separately fr om 
nonconfidential information, and that access to confidential 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
with respect to employees with one type of impairment may be 
impermissible with respect to another impairment. Cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999) (determination as to the existence 
of a disability is not to be made by blanket r eference to categories of 
impairments, but instead by case-by-case examination of the impact of 
the impairment on the individual claimant). Thus, the process of 
determining which employees are "similarly situated" to a plaintiff so as 
to allow for a meaningful comparison can be a complicated one. 
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files be limited). CATA has conceded that it violated the 
ADA by improperly commingling the medical r ecords of 
employees with nonconfidential files. After the Union filed a 
grievance regarding these practices, CA TA brought itself 
into compliance with the Act, and the Union withdr ew the 
grievance. Based upon this history, the District Court 
concluded that Tice had not been "pr ejudiced" and thus 
could not pursue his claim. We agree, and thus, once 
again, need not decide in the first instance whether 
nondisabled individuals are permitted to bring suit for 
violations of S 12112(d).11  
 
Other courts of appeals have addressed the question 
whether a plaintiff has a cause of action for a violation of 
S 12112(d) without demonstrating the existence of an 
injury-in-fact, either through actual damage (emotional, 
pecuniary, or otherwise), or through the pr esence of a 
continuing illegal practice to which plaintif f is likely to be 
subject absent court intervention. All have concluded that 
a violation of S 12112(d), without such a showing, presents 
no "injury" capable of remedy, and thus affords no basis for 
suit. See Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light , 188 F.3d 
964, 971 (8th Cir. 1999) (remanding for a determination as 
to whether the improper medical inquiry caused a "tangible 
injury" capable of supporting the suit); Ar mstrong v. Turner 
Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(dismissing a claim for damages from an allegedly improper 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Tice interpreted the District Court to have concluded that he was 
legally "barred" from asserting his claim by first electing to pursue a 
union remedy. We do not share his understanding of the court's holding. 
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. , 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme 
Court explained that employees could pursue discrimination claims 
against their employers both through union grievance procedures and in 
federal court. In so holding, the Court observed that such a system 
would not grant "windfall" double-recoveries to plaintiffs, in part 
because 
if the union procedures fully remedy the violation, there will be "no 
further relief for the court to grant." Id. at n.14. Regardless of whether 
Alexander's holding with respect to the availability of "dual" fora 
applies 
to ADA claims, cf. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 
(1998) (refusing to decide Alexander's applicability to ADA claims), 
certainly Alexander establishes that the disposition of a union grievance 
is relevant to the inquiry as to whether an employee has suffered any 
remediable injury as a result of the alleged civil rights violations. 
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medical examination for lack of cognizable injury; no 
standing for injunctive relief because, despite the presence 
of continuing employer violations, there was no allegation 
that this particular plaintiff would again be subject to 
examination); cf. Griffin v. SteelTek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 595 
(10th Cir. 1998) (permitting a nondisabled plaintiff to sue 
for improper medical inquiry because the plaintiff alleged 
that revelations elicited via the inquiries had caused 
employer to refuse to hire him, thus r esulting in an injury- 
in-fact). We ally ourselves with these holdings.12 
 
Beyond the bare allegations of "mental/emotional 
distress, mental anguish, stress and inconvenience" set 
forth in his initial complaint, Tice has submitted no 
evidence as to the actual existence of such har ms as a 
result of CATA's ADA violations. Indeed, he has not even 
identified a single person who improperly viewed his 
medical files. As the Fifth Circuit has stated in the context 
of preemployment examinations and inquiries, there is no 
indication in either the text of the ADA or in its history that 
a technical violation of S 12112(d) was intended to give rise 
to damages liability. See Armstrong , 141 F.3d at 561. 
Therefore, we hold that Tice may not maintain his suit 
against his employer on the ground of impr oper 
recordkeeping. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to CATA will be affir med. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
12. We do not reach any conclusion with respect to the correctness of 
these courts' determinations as to whether the plaintiffs in those cases 
alleged the existence of a redressable "injury" within the meaning of the 
ADA; we merely agree that in the absence of injury -- however defined 
-- no claim can lie for a violation of S 12112(d). 
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